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The United States Army War College
The United States Army War College (USAWC) educates and develops leaders for service
at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application of Landpower. The purpose of the USAWC is to produce graduates who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem
solvers. Concurrently, it is the USAWC’s duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for
commanders and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage in discourse
and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving national security objectives.

The Carlisle Scholars Program
The Carlisle Scholars Program (CSP) seeks to educate select USAWC students through innovative, purpose-driven projects undertaken in partnership with the strategic-level defense analysis and decision making communities. CSP scholars “learn by doing,” as they gain a practical
understanding of strategy and policy development via direct participation in important debates
alongside working analysts and defense stakeholders. CSP students are provided with enhanced
opportunities to substantively examine and influence important national security issues through
collaborative relationships with senior government decision makers and leading policy experts.
With support of USAWC faculty, scholars pursue both individual and collaborative research and
writing initiatives. In every instance, the individual student’s charter is to gain new understanding
of a critical issue and translate that understanding either into a more thorough appreciation of
the current and future decision making context or a set of actionable recommendations for senior leaders. In the end, CSP aims to build and maintain a lasting dialogue between USAWC, its
faculty, its students, and the wider national security analysis and decision making communities.

Disclaimer
This final report of the Russia wargame hosted April 15 and 16, 2015, is produced under the purview of the United States Army War College to foster dialogue of topics with strategic
ramifications.
The ideas and viewpoints advanced in this publication are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the institution, the Department of Defense, or
any other department or agency of the United States Government.
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Executive Summary
Russian aggression in 2014 caught U.S. policy and strategy off guard, forcing reactive measures and
reevaluation of the U.S. approach toward Russia. Moscow employed nonlinear methodologies and
operated just beneath traditional thresholds of conflict to take full advantage of U.S. and NATO
policy and process limitations. In light of this strategic problem, the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), conducted a wargame that revealed four key considerations for future policy and strategy.

• The U.S. must shift from a mostly cooperative approach towards Russia to
one that recognizes the competitive nature of Moscow
Moscow consistently pursues the development of frozen conflicts, exclusionary bi-lateral relationships, “sweetheart” and opaque economic deals, and proxy forces willing to
promote Russian interests, all in an effort to ‘win’ against the West. Meanwhile, current
U.S. policy describes Russia as both a competitor and a cooperative partner. In reality it
is clear that the U.S. and Russian systems are inherently competitive, especially regarding Russia’s “near abroad,” NATO, Asia, and the Arctic. A clear U.S. policy that illuminates the competitive nature of the two systems is a necessary step towards regaining the
strategic initiative.

•U
 .S. policy must clearly articulate its position toward Russia, Eastern Europe,
and Ukraine
U.S. lack of clarity and prioritization toward Russia, Eastern Europe, and Ukraine creates hesitancy and risk aversion, and limits innovation on both sides of the Atlantic. The
United States must develop a coherent, unified policy toward Russia, one that avoids
creating disunity within the transatlantic community.
Differences in how the United States and Europe view the incorporation of Russia into
a European security architecture are fundamental and will continue to create wedges in
the transatlantic community that Moscow will seek to exploit.
To strengthen deterrence and reassurance, the United States should consistently reiterate its Article 5 obligations. Meanwhile, Washington must also clarify U.S. interests in
the Ukraine crisis, otherwise it is likely to continue causing confusion among European
allies.
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• U.S. policy must challenge Russia in the competition of ideas and influence
Russia emphasizes information operations as central to its strategy. The United States
advocates the power and influence of a truthful message, but approaches the issue more
defensively and incoherently. The United States must undertake a more robust information campaign.

• U.S. policy must account for the two national election cycles in 2016 and 2018
President Putin needs a political “win” before 2017 to ensure success in the 2018 Russian
elections. What is unknown is what actions he will take to achieve that “win” and how
he may use the U.S. election cycle as an opportunity. The United States must be pro-active in shaping the environment prior to Putin taking the initiative.

vi
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Introduction
The reemergence of Russian aggression in 2014 forced an immediate review and evaluation of U.S. policy and strategy toward Europe and Russia. Russian nonlinear approaches, often
operating just beneath traditional thresholds of conflict, exploited weaknesses of longstanding U.S.
and NATO policy constructs, exposing gaps and seams that now require reexamination. Trends
within the strategic environment indicate that the nature of the U.S.-Russian relationship is likely
to remain competitive, thus requiring a critical look at current assumptions and a comprehensive
reexamination of Western thinking about Russia.
In support of that reexamination, in October 2014, a team of six students from the CSP at
the USAWC began a six-month project to assess the driving factors behind Russian foreign and
security policy, in order to better anticipate future behavior. The project was grounded in systems
thinking and aimed at building a strategic-level system design of Russia as a point of departure for
research, analysis, collaboration, and experimentation. The CSP team created a visualization and
formal paper describing what it came to term “the Russian System,” culminating in a strategic-level
wargame to test key hypotheses and expand collaborative learning. This report provides some insights into the broader project, but is more focused on the results of the wargame and how those
results can inform future thinking about U.S.-Russian relations.

Methodology
Systems thinking is a subcategory of critical thinking and an appropriate tool for addressing complex, strategic-level problems. This project attempted to see Russia holistically, properly
arranging Russian actors and relationships and defining the environmental, historical, and cultural
forces behind observed system behavior and patterns. The overarching idea behind this method,
is that once one can fully visualize a system and begin to understand that system’s logic, one can
better anticipate future behavior, identify second and third order effects, accurately conceptualize
risk, and potentially influence strategic outcomes. Here is a synopsis of the system design method
to learning that produced the team’s understanding of the Russian System:
1) Initial Research – The team conducted intensive research into Russian history, economy,
politics, and military reform. Additionally, the team reviewed current news reports, field
reports, and commentary by Russia experts across multiple disciplines. This created the
foundation to begin initial system design.
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2) Brainstorming and Synthesis – The team identified the array of actors, relationships,
and forces that contribute to Russian behavior. This established the framework for the
Russian System, but fell short in fully explaining causal relationships. Assumptions and
hypotheses generated from these sessions drove additional research and review.
3) Follow-on Research – The team conducted another research effort dedicated to accumulating more data to support, or disprove, ideas discussed during initial system synthesis.
4) Visualization of the Russian System – As additional data and analytical refinement
strengthened the team’s understanding of the array of actors and forces, the next step was
to create a visualization of the system to guide further analysis.

Figure 1: Visualization of the Russian System
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5) Collaborative Learning and System Reframe – Over the next three months, the team
engaged think tanks, Department of Defense entities, academic institutions, and international organizations to discuss and critique the conceptualization of the Russian System.
These discussions resulted in further refinement of the system model and the causal relationships that underpin it.
6) Wargame and System Testing – On 15 and 16 April 2015, the U.S. Army War College
hosted a strategic level wargame designed to test the ideas behind the Russia System and
act as a venue for thought experimentation, synthesis of perspectives, and competitive
heuristics related to the nature of U.S.-Russian relations. The overarching objective of
the effort was to assess the implications for the U.S. military of various potential future
scenarios.

The Future of U.S.-Russian Relations
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Wargame Design
The U.S. Army War College designed the wargame to be a semi-competitive, heuristic exercise to test and improve understanding of the Russia System while facilitating a more rigorous
assessment of the likely future directions of U.S.-Russian relations through introduction of dynamic uncertainty, differing perspectives, multiple domains, and analysis of all elements of national
power. In order to achieve these objectives, participants were divided into three teams – a Russia
Team, a U.S. Team, and a ‘White Cell’ Team.
The Russia Team was comprised of academics, think tank experts, State Department personnel, and Department of Defense experts on Russia. The Russia team included a wide range of
perspectives, including “Kremlinologists” and Russian historians, native Russian-speaking journalists, and inter-agency experts on current Russian affairs. The Russia Team played the role of Putin’s
inner circle in the Kremlin and was charged with seeking ways to expand and improve Russian
standing and influence, while maintaining Putin’s grip on political power.
The U.S. Team was comprised of current NATO planners, Russia scholars, and European
security policy experts from multiple think tanks, the State Department, academia, and the U.S.
military. The U.S. Team played the role of U.S. policy makers in Washington, DC and were required
to carefully consider EU, NATO, and individual European national perspectives throughout the
wargame. Their goal was to create policy and strategy designed to maintain a stable, secure, and
prosperous Europe in accordance with National Security Strategy objectives.
The White Team was comprised predominantly of Army War College students, faculty, and
international fellows from NATO countries and Eastern European Partners. The role of the White
Team was to assess U.S. and Russian policy choices, and provide insights from the represented national perspectives.
The wargame consisted of several possible future scenarios involving the United States
and Russia. The scenarios were designed to challenge certain elements of the Russian System in
a progressively more rigorous fashion. The scenarios were presented in a six-turn sequence, with
each turn comprised of a period for Russia and U.S. team deliberation, policy implementation, and
then reactive counter-moves. Meanwhile, the White Team also deliberated each turn, and offered
analysis and evaluation of decisions by the Russia and U.S. teams. The turns were as follows:
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1) The status quo continues for an indefinite period with little significant change
2) Europe moves rapidly towards energy independence from Russia
3) Expansion of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and a regional miscalculation
4) A nationalist uprising within Russia and incident within the Baltic States
5) Putin is removed from power and Russia must stabilize its situation
6) Getting beyond a constant state of crisis

The Future of U.S.-Russian Relations
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Turn 1: Continuation of Status Quo
The first session tasked each team with examining current policies and strategies, and to assess the implications of
the status quo persisting for some period of time. The White
Team focused its efforts on providing a Euro-centric critique
of current Russia and U.S. policy.
The Russia Team looked carefully at the forces that are
driving current Russian behavior and policy. Although there
was not complete consensus on what Russia’s objectives are,
there was general agreement on several policy and strategy
related issues. Key points discussed during this turn included
the following:
•

“Russia
appears to
seek global
relevance.”

Does Putin have a grand strategy?
o Perhaps he does not, and is instead improvising and adjusting as he navigates Russia through the strategic environment.
o On the other hand, perhaps the strategic aim for Putin and his trusted circle
is the maintenance, preservation, and perpetuation of the current system of
power and wealth distribution with Russia.
o From another perspective, Putin’s strategy appears focused on restoring
Russian greatness and prestige in the eyes of Russians and the international
community.

•

Russian behavior appears to be driven by a feeling of constraint. The United States
and the greater West are typically viewed as interfering with Russian desires, creating conditions for a competitive relationship.
o Ironically though, Russians may be willing to pardon or tolerate Western
interference in exchange for capital investment.
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•

Russia appears to seek global relevance. Investment in global reach technologies
and capabilities demonstrates that Russia is not content to confine its influence to
the ‘near abroad’ and other surrounding territories.

•

Russians appear somewhat hesitant to use overt military action to achieve policy
aims. In some cases, they seem more comfortable cloaking their military actions
with other events, and fully integrating military force with other elements of na
U.S. Army War College

•

tional power. They also seem keenly aware of how far they can push the United
States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) without provoking an
unintended conflict.

•

Putin appears to find great utility in creating ‘frozen conflicts’, perhaps as a means
of providing Russia with tools to barter, negotiate, or rapidly escalate or deescalate.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Team was in agreement that current U.S. policy needs adjustment in
order to recognize U.S.-Russian strategic competition. Following additional deliberation, the U.S.
Team concluded that the status quo would not suffice in safeguarding American or Western interests at a reasonable cost. Hence, the U.S. Team discussed how the status quo could be strengthened:
•

And should continue to deter any Russian efforts to destabilize U.S. allies and European partners, and the United States should continue to affirm the importance of
sovereignty and the rules of the international system.

•

The United States should initiate a discussion within NATO clarifying the meaning
of Article 5 in an era of emerging security issues, including cyber conflict, hybrid
warfare, and energy security.

•

The United States should continue to seek areas of cooperation with Russia on a
range of regional and global issues. Nonetheless, a return to business as usual – perhaps through another ‘reset’ with Russia – is not possible in the short term.

•

The United States should give higher strategic priority to Europe and consider stationing additional military forces in strategic locations within the region.

After the Russia and U.S. teams presented their assessments, the White Team – comprised primarily of Europeans – shared the results of their analysis:
•

Continuation of the status quo perpetuates what many in Europe perceive as a lack
of clarity, prioritization, and strength in U.S. policy.

•

The status quo risks allowing economic and social conditions in Ukraine to worsen
in the near to mid-term.

•

Subsequently, the status quo may facilitate or promote Russian advantages in narrative and strategic initiative.

•

Current information and influence operations by the United States are ineffective.

•

The current Article 5 construct may not be sufficient given information and cyber
infractions against NATO allies. The United States should lead this discussion for it
to resonate among the 28 member nations.

The Future of U.S.-Russian Relations
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•

Current U.S. and Western policies may not sufficiently appreciate Russia’s perceptions of honor and power. Failure to account for Russian perceptions of these and
related concepts may reinforce Putin’s narrative and his appeal within Russia.

•

The United States should continue its efforts at building partner capacity -– strengthening NATO and the European Union (EU) will increase the role of European partners and will reduce strategic costs in the long term.

U.S. Army War College

Turn 2: Europe Moves Rapidly Towards Energy Independence from Russia
In this scenario, the teams explored the implications of a more energy independent Europe
within the next five years. This scenario assumed that Russian attempts to fracture NATO through
energy leverage deals had backfired and a unified Europe reacted by seeking alternative energy
sources. Consequently, the United States and Europe started to earnestly develop the necessary infrastructure and diversification to insure their energy needs without fear of Russian manipulation
or leverage.

Figure 2: Russian Gas Pipelines

The Russia Team sought to take advantage of their short-term advantages in the energy
market and extract as much capital as possible from the West, largely as a means of safeguarding
Russia’s fiscal situation and forestalling domestic political tensions that could arise in the wake of
The Future of U.S.-Russian Relations
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•

Supported Russia’s desires to sell energy to Europe, but wanted to ensure the arrangement somehow precluded Russian ‘bullying’ of energy importing nations in
Europe.

•

Proposed investment of public and private funds into infrastructure and technology to improve storage and security of hydrocarbons, to include investment in
Ukrainian energy infrastructure to increase capacity.

•

Sought to prepare the EU and NATO for Russian attempts to undermine energy
transformation, including Russian pressure on Ukraine, launching cyber-attacks
targeting key energy transit nodes in the public and private sectors, and seeking to
influence political parties and NGOs in Eastern and Central Europe to not support
the energy independence movement.

•

Suggested the U.S. should engage Moscow on the benefits to Russia of a more open,
competitive energy market.

White Team observations of Russian and U.S. actions were not focused on the importance of an
energy independent Europe, but rather recognized trends in how the U.S. and Russia teams implemented their strategies:
•

The White Team was critical of the U.S. Team’s strategic communications and influence campaigns during the energy transition period. In particular, they criticized
U.S. efforts to combat the Russia Team’s heavy information operations (IO) campaign to undermining European energy independence.

•

The White Team observed that U.S. policy and action was consistently ‘softer’ than
Russia’s. Russia always sought to gain the initiative by attacking U.S. policy, seeking vulnerabilities in the European alliance, and skillfully blending and integrating
multiple instruments of national power. The Russian Team seemed unconcerned
with the U.S. Team overreacting, and appeared to recognize they could aggressively
undermine the energy independence movement without significant consequence.

This scenario validated the idea that a Europe less energy dependent on Russia is more
secure. However, total energy independence from Russia did not appear to be in either team’s interests. Rather, any concerted attempt towards energy independence will force a significant Russian
response. Although concerned with the idea of an energy independent Europe, Moscow is likely
to remain confident that it has the time and leverage to undermine these efforts. Both the U.S. and
Russia teams identified common interests in ensuring continued energy investments, economic
diversification, and healthy economic competition.
10
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higher unemployment and slower economic growth. The question of European energy independence was a serious matter for the Russia Team as they sought to undermine Western policies
aimed at European energy diversification. Nevertheless, the desire for increased security competition with the West was limited. The Russia Team instead offered a rational, pragmatic, and proactive approach, which included the following:
•

Undermining European plans through the pursuit of “sweetheart” deals with energy vulnerable states.

•

Preserving long term access to energy revenue through demand diversification
into Africa, China, and India.

•

Increasing energy prices in the short term to take advantage of current European
energy dependence and extract as much capital as possible, and subsequently investing these energy windfalls into diversification, expansion, and modernization
of energy sectors.

•

Leveraging Moscow’s relationship with Germany to undermine European plans
for energy independence.

•

Accelerating attempts to improve effectiveness in combating corruption as a means
to make the Russian budget and economy more resilient and less wasteful.

•

Continuing to bear in mind the impact of reduced government revenues on the
2018 Russian national elections.

The U.S. Team responded to this
scenario by acknowledging the need for
a global energy market that works better
for all suppliers and consumers. While the
team was not able to more fully develop
what defined this market, they did note
that it would include a more resilient and
efficient liquefied natural gas (LNG) market and sought a market in which natural
gas was no longer. More broadly though,
the key concern was maintaining European unity. The U.S. Team emphasized the
need to demonstrate support for European
energy needs, while ensuring that all stakeholders understood the security consequences of energy dependence on Russia.
In summary, the U.S. Team:

The Future of U.S.-Russian Relations

The United States
must help to
preclude “Russian
‘bullying’ of
energy importing
nations in Europe”
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Turn 3: Ukraine Conflict Expands / Potential for a Regional
Miscalculation Increases
One of the more likely scenarios to unfold in the coming months is a violation of the current Minsk II Agreement and subsequent expansion of the conflict within Ukraine. In this scenario, pro-Russian separatists resumed offensive combat operations in Eastern Ukraine with the
goal of capturing Mariupol. Tensions between Russia and Ukraine also manifested themselves in
an exchange of gunfire between Ukrainian security forces and Russian soldiers exercising within
Transnistria, along Ukraine’s border with Moldova. Adding to this was a bomb blast in Ukraine that
caused the deaths of two U.S. soldiers involved in training Ukrainian Defense Forces. Lastly, concerned leaders in Tbilisi, following the completion of
a NATO-Georgian military exercise, and in light of
the expanded conflict in Ukraine, began aggressive
lobbying both publically and privately for NATO to
move forward with the promise of membership and
issue Georgia a Membership Action Plan.
The Russia Team was unified in its support
for ethnic Russians within Ukraine and was determined not to let Russian separatists fail. Despite this
backing, the Russia Team was non-supportive of
the attempt to capture Mariupol. The Russia Team
was not concerned with establishing a land bridge
to support Crimea – especially given the escalatory nature of such an operation and the difficulty of
defending any such gains – and hence were content
to maintain the status quo established by the Minsk
II Agreement. The Russia Team was generally more
interested in keeping their strategic advantages with
the current ‘frozen conflict’ and did not wish to escalate, although they did see these events as an opportunity to discredit and disadvantage the United
States. Moreover, the Russia Team had the following
observations:

12

“The United
States should
consider
designating both
Ukraine and
Georgia as
major nonNATO allies.”

•

The Minsk II Agreement seems acceptable to all parties except Ukraine.

•

Russia, the United States, and Europe can afford to be patient and careful regarding
Ukraine, while leaders in Kyiv attempt to make this a time-sensitive crisis.
U.S. Army War College

•

Moscow would likely vehemently deny any involvement in provoking events in
Moldova or in the death of U.S. troops. To the contrary, Russia would be likely to
blame the United States for the deaths, due to Washington’s meddling in the region.

•

The United States would be unlikely to allow Georgia to become a NATO member
due to intra-alliance disagreements on this subject, and due to a fear of provoking
Russia. Hence it would be best for Moscow to allow NATO to deny Georgia membership, and then immediately make positive overtures to establish better relations
between Russia and Georgia while simultaneously discrediting the United States
and NATO.

The U.S. Team saw this crisis as a chance to place a higher strategic priority on Ukraine,
making it central to the core U.S. policy of deterring Russian aggression. The U.S. Team wanted to
ensure it clearly communicated to both Russia and Europe the American readiness and willingness
to prevent Moscow from further destabilizing the region. The U.S. Team agreed that, in light of
the unfolding scenario, previous approaches had likely been too ‘soft’ and ambiguous, and that the
United States should endeavor to communicate strength during this crisis. Other observations and
assessments are as follows:
•

The United States should consider designating both Ukraine and Georgia as major
non-NATO allies. This was both a diplomatic symbol and an avenue for providing
increase security assistance, training opportunities, and armaments to these states.

•

Washington ought to promote greater NATO support in the region.

•

Although underwriting Ukrainian and Georgian security in a more open, aggressive manner would cause controversy within NATO and risk feeding Russia’s anti-Western narrative, the risk of inaction would likely be more dangerous.

•

The United States ought to consider raising the costs to Russia for any conflict expansion, though imposing sanctions on Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication (SWIFT) network transactions between banks ought to be held
in abeyance for the moment.

•

Ukraine would likely be the best place to confront Russia and to send a clear message of intent, capability, and will.

White Team observations were focused on Russian advantages in the region and the difficulty the United States faces when trying to counter these advantages. Additionally, the White
Team was quick to recognize the risks the United States incurs when pursuing actions independent
of Europe and NATO:

The Future of U.S.-Russian Relations

13

•

The United States has a greater evidentiary standard than Russia when proving intent and involvement in the region. The United States must accept a burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, where Russia only needs to show a degree of doubt.
This dynamic plays into Russian success with ambiguous approaches and Moscow’s
ability to create uncertainty and doubt within the West.

•

Time is one of Russia’s greatest advantages – they can wait for small gains, consolidate them patiently, de-escalate tensions, and then wait and set conditions for the
next opportunity. Western reactive policies play to this strength.

•

Proposed American reactions as outlined by the U.S. Team would be too reactionary in their approach. Only after the deaths of U.S. soldiers, or some similar tragedy,
would a stronger policy and strategy be put in place.

•

The United States ought to increase diplomatic efforts with France and Germany.
That solidarity, they argued, would prove formidable to Russia, though the United
States must be ready to manage and overcome a European perspective that some
battles cannot be won.

Overall, the notable disparity on how to approach war in Ukraine and Crimea only served
to reinforce the frozen conflict within the region. The Russia Team consistently sought to develop
tools to enable strategic flexibility in the absence of a long term strategy. The creation of proxies,
bi-lateral relationships, “sweetheart” economic deals, and information and influence campaigns are
the mechanisms that could allow Russia to take advantage of strategic opportunities or to hedge
against uncertainty. This scenario showed a clear parallel between current observed Russian behavior and a Russia penchant for creating multiple options in lieu of pursuing a single, clear, long-term
strategy.

14
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Turn 4: Runaway Nationalism in Russia
Throughout the conflicts of the Putin era, Russia has ‘weaponized’ nationalism, using aggressive patriotic rhetoric as part of influence campaigns to motivate the Russian population at
home and across the near abroad. By blaming the West and accusing NATO of threatening Russia,
Putin builds and furthers anti-Western feelings and encourages a dangerous mix of nationalism
and patriotism that is hostile toward the West. In this scenario, Russian nationalists in Russia and
elsewhere have taken to the streets in violent protests of Putin’s inability to resolve the Ukraine
crisis decisively in Russia’s favor and to save the deteriorating Russian economy. One demonstration in Latvia has resulted in the accidental shooting of a Russian protest leader by a Latvian Police
Officer – raw video footage of the incident has gone viral online. Protesters demand that Putin live
up to his pledge as protector of Russia and take stronger actions in Ukraine and the region. Some
of the most vocal nationalist leaders and media have even called for a new government.
Ethnic Russian
Percentage

Russia

Finland

Estonia
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Lithuania
Russia
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Belarus

Ukraine

Slovakia

Kazakhstan
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Romania
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Turkey

Turkmenistan

DPRK
Tajikistan

Iran
Syria
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China

Georgia

Macedonia

Pakistan

Iraq

Afghanistan

ROK

India

Figure 3: Ethnic Russian Population

The Russia Team assessed that Moscow’s primary challenge would be demonstrating
strength to the Russian people without provoking a wider conflict with NATO. Putin in particular
would likely feel compelled to take action or face losing legitimacy in the eyes of the Russian people. Other Russia Team assessments included the following:
The Future of U.S.-Russian Relations
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•

It seems likely that Moscow would deploy military forces within a few kilometers of the Russia-Latvia border. Blending information and influence operations
throughout such moves, Moscow would likely characterize any deployments as
purely defensive. Simultaneously, Moscow would likely demand an investigation
into the shooting of the Russian citizen, offering to lead the investigation and any
subsequent prosecution.

•

Despite the rapid escalation of the
crisis, Moscow would likely then try
to bring about a controlled de-escalation.

Russia is
likely to “rely
heavily on its
strengths in
information
operations,
influence, and
control.”

•

It is possible that Russia might conduct a more aggressive and clandestine operation using Russian
SOF, intelligence, and transnational
criminal elements to abduct the Latvian Police Officer and bring him
to Russia to stand trial. In order to
avoid Article 5 implications, the use
of criminal organizations would
create sufficient ambiguity.

•

In any case, Russia would likely rely
heavily on its strengths in information operations, influence, and
control. Actions within this domain
might include spinning the events
to show Russian dominance of and
need to control the near abroad, the
enlistment of Vladimir Zhirinovsky
to counter more extreme Russian nationalist groups, and inciting anti-Russian
sentiment in the region to elicit a NATO response to be further exploited by Russian information operations.

•

Given Russian presidential elections coming up in 2018, Putin would likely feel
compelled to create some sort of “political win” in the short-term to maintain and
perhaps boost his legitimacy if the Russian economy continues to struggle.

•

Lastly, Russia might offer to assist the EU and the Baltic states in restoring order
and creating the conditions necessary for peace. This might include a plan to contribute to a regional stability force, through which Russia could then demonstrate
strength and reinforce its position as guarantor of the Russian people.
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The U.S. Team assessed that Washington has an interest in supporting Russian internal stability. If so, the United States might conclude that the protests inside Russia and elsewhere, as well
as the accidental shooting within Latvia, were strictly domestic issues, and that Washington would
likely seek to reinforce support for democratic rules and processes.
•

The United States would likely attempt to remind governments across the region
about the destabilizing effects of runaway nationalism, and encourage and support
actions to fully integrate ethnic and Russian-speaking populations, to include the
sizeable Russian-speaking minority in Ukraine.

•

Washington would also likely encourage the EU – vs. NATO – to provide border
security and policing assistance to the Baltic States.

•

As a means of demonstrating patience and restraint, the United States might also
push to postpone planned NATO exercises near areas of tension.

•

Finally, it seems likely that Washington would try to avoid reacting too aggressively
– for example, by deploying U.S. or NATO forces to the Baltic States – to the deployment of any Russian forces along the Russian-Latvian border.

White Team observations reinforced the importance of restraint with two key observations:
•

The NATO alliance would need to react cautiously to events in such a crisis. Sending
the wrong signals to Russia could create the conditions for miscalculation as the
Russians attempt paradoxically to de-escalate through escalation.

•

Any U.S. effort to unilaterally escalate conflict with Russia might bring about Washington’s isolation from its European allies.

In this scenario, the United States would likely struggle to compete with Russia in terms of
ideas and influence. Russia would be likely to consistently exploit its advantages in the information
realm and cause indecisiveness within the United States and within the West more broadly. Of
special note, this scenario further highlighted the danger of differing transatlantic perspectives on
regional challenges.

The Future of U.S.-Russian Relations
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Turn 5: The Power Elites Turn Against Putin
The next turn of the wargame explored a possible scenario where Putin is removed from
power by disaffected and disenfranchised elites. In this scenario, Putin’s continued trend of centralization of control and power and his ever-shrinking inner circle has created the potential for
the emergence of alternatives to Putin and an implosion of his autocracy. More specifically, in
this scenario Russia’s economic decline has continued with a corresponding rise in nationalist and
anti-Western rhetoric from the Kremlin. However, unchecked corruption and inefficiency have
continued to plague the Russian economy. Capital flight, defection of oligarchs, imprisonment of
political opposition leaders, the sacking of questionable government institutional elites, the rise of
strongmen like Ramzan Kadryov, and the continued consolidation of power and wealth by Putin’s
shrinking inner circle have created the conditions for elites across Russia to seek an alternative form of governance. Those elites, including
the siloviki, economic oligarchs, and disaffected
regional leaders have begun to seriously question
the direction Putin has been setting for Russia –
as a result, their self-interests have finally come
into direct conflict with political loyalties. The
teams considered who or what might succeed
Putin, what path the new regime would set for
Russia, and how the United States should approach a new Russian regime.

It is “unlikely that
a new, fragile
[post-Putin]
regime would
return any gains
made in Crimea.”

The Russia Team assessed that it is possible that any number of radical alternatives to
Putin, such as an ultra-nationalist leader, former
Soviet era leaders, and progressive, liberal opposition elites, might come to power. However, the Russia Team concluded that the most likely
outcome of this scenario would be a quiet putsch in which existing elites, perhaps led by Dmitry
Medvedev, would assume control of the government and renew a program of liberalization and
reform. Any new government would likely be extremely fragile and vulnerable to counteractions
from other regional leaders or Moscow-based elites, and thus a follow-on regime would likely be
motivated to engage in positive dialogue with the West soon after transition and power consolidation.
•
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The two most important priorities for the new regime would likely be to solve the
Ukrainian crisis and clamp down on corruption. These efforts would buy the new
regime time and space, both internationally and domestically, to establish itself
and prevent Russia from slipping toward further internal conflict.
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•

Given the interests and motivations of the forces most likely to push Putin aside, it
seems probable that a new regime would emphasize economic liberalization and
perhaps even reform. Nonetheless, it would seem unlikely that a new, fragile regime would return any gains made in Crimea, or to apologize for any previous
conflicts.

•

If a new regime were the product of Moscow-based elites, there is the possibility
for regional leaders to turn against the center. For this reason, the Russia Team assessed that a new regime would be more open to engaging with the West in order
to end economic sanctions. Desperation might even push a new regime in Moscow
to seek some type of economic assistance from the West, particularly if the Russian
economy has entered a prolonged period of decline.

•

Any new regime would be unlikely to hold power, nor win the favor of the West,
without free national elections, probably within several months of coming to power.

•

A new regime would likely seize the opportunity to abandon Russian isolationism
and engage the West. Part of this engagement could result in a ‘de-Putinization’
policy which would likely be supported by the oligarchs, but with appropriate reform to prevent Russia from slipping back into the chaos of the 1990s.

The U.S. Team assessed that Putin’s sudden fall from power would pose great challenges to
American foreign policy while also offering the potential to fundamentally change the nature of
the U.S.-Russian relationship. A cautiously optimistic Washington would therefore be likely to offer
support and perhaps even assistance to a new Russian regime.
•

It is likely that Washington would want to signal its willingness to engage the new
regime, perhaps by lifting sanctions on the banking sector in exchange for a return
to the Minsk Accords.

•

Another potential tool for increased cooperation might be the reopening of mil-tomil communications and engagement. This could have the added benefit of helping
to ensure the safety and security of Russian nuclear weapons and related infrastructure.

•

Nevertheless, the United States would likely remain resolute in insisting that Russia
return to adhering to the rules of the international system, and that forced changes
to recognized borders as well as other violations of international laws would prevent
the West from fully embracing the new regime.

•

Throughout, the United States would increase the odds of success if it recognized
Russia’s honor and treated the transition as a manifestation of self-determination
within Russia.

The Future of U.S.-Russian Relations
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The White Team agreed that Washington would likely be cautiously optimistic. Nonetheless, the White Team assessed that the United States would need to engage in a proactive and positive information and strategic communications campaign to take advantage of the opportunity.
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•

The United States would likely need to take the lead in coordination with Europe
to promote positive strategic communications and influence. This would enable the
West to avoid more reactive information operations, which have proven to have
little impact and which may actually discredit the West.

•

The West would likely need to pull any new regime in Russia into immediate discussions on European security.

•

The West might increase its odds of success if it relied more upon the EU rather than
NATO for engaging Russia during any transition. Germany and France, among other European nations, could be very effective in helping Russia chart a positive path
for all sides during this window of change.
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Turn 6: Getting Beyond Crisis Mode
In the final turn, the teams were asked to identify the ideal state of U.S.-Russia relations and
to offer suggestions on how the United States and Russia might achieve this objective within five
years. This scenario was designed to force proactive policy and strategy measures that each side
could take outside the confines of any crisis, which had animated each of the preceding turns.
The Russia Team described Moscow’s ideal
state of relationship with the United States as one
of mutual respect and equality. The Russia Team assessed that Russia desires global influence and the
ability to participate and partner with other states in
solving global problems. At the same time, Moscow
also likely seeks dominance over what it considers
Russia’s sphere of influence, and would therefore
oppose U.S. and NATO influence inside the near
abroad. As long as Moscow perceives Russia to be
subordinated to the U.S. and NATO, Russian foreign policy would continue to compete and counter
Western actions.

“Russia is likely
to continue
pursuing
dominance over
Eurasia through
a strong,
centralized
leadership
system”

•

Russia is likely to continue pursuing
dominance over Eurasia through a
strong, centralized leadership system.

•

The respect of other nations is important to the ideal state that Russia seeks for itself. Russia appears to
want to participate equally within
the G20 and to participate in solving
crises around the globe.

•

It is highly unlikely that Russia would ever tolerate the reality or perception of subordination to NATO or the United States.

•

Given its insecurities, Moscow is likely to believe that treaties serve to constrain
Russia and leave it little flexibility.
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•

Moscow is likely to favor more engagement with developing economies, in order to
create an alternative to the United States and the EU as partners for development
and investment.

•

In the same vein, Russia is likely to accelerate efforts to improve relationships and
influence within Asia.

•

Russia will most likely see continuing utility in maintaining frozen conflicts as a
way to ensure it can preserve its sphere of interest.

The U.S. Team assessed Russia will likely continue to frustrate Washington’s vision of a
Europe that is free, whole, and at peace. Hence, even though the United States may seek areas of cooperation with Russia on points of mutual interest, the best case over the next five years is a period
of competitive but stable relations with Russia.
•

The United States and Russia are most likely to achieve cooperation on counter terrorism, nuclear arms reductions, missile defense, space exploration, and mil-to-mil
activities.

•

The United States may be able to convince Russia to leave the Donbas, but it is unlikely to get Russia to return Crimea to Ukrainian authority.

•

The sooner the United States accepts the new reality of a competitive relationships
with Russia, the sooner the West can compete more effectively.

•

The West can best promote its interests by maintaining a unified front, and by consolidating military, economic, and political strengths.

•

Western strategy is likely to be more successful if NATO can more effectively compete in the contest of ideas and communication. The West should strive for information that is timely, accurate, and effectively delivered as the best means of changing
the current situation of instability within Eastern Europe and thereby setting conditions for long term stability.

The White Team assessed that a primary problem for the United States in developing a long
term relationship with Russia is one of size and influence. The United States has many interests
around the world, but Russia’s seem far more limited or concentrated. Managing this disparity will
help establish the parameters for more effective long term U.S.-Russian relations.
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Conclusion
Change and evolution within the strategic environment are constant. Actors, relationships,
and systems adapt or transform to circumstances and events that are often very difficult to foresee.
The reemergence of Russian aggression in 2014 was one such event, catching the United States
and its NATO allies by surprise. The reexamination of the U.S.-Russian relationship in the past
12 months has led to a renewed search for insight into modern Russia. That search has resulted in
a greater understanding of the ‘Russian system’ and the forces of stasis and change at work on its
various components.
This project used systems thinking design methods to analyze and collaborate, leading to
increased understanding of the Russian system. The subsequent wargame was tied to the design
approach and led to richer levels of structured collaboration, which permitted a more in-depth
analysis of Russia and U.S. policy toward Russia.
The structure of the wargame was based on scenarios and questions that Russia, the United
States, and Europe will most likely face in the near to midterm. Exploring these questions shed light
into how each side thought about issues, priorities, risk, and alternatives when developing policy
and strategy.
Four policy considerations emerged from the wargame. The United States must:
•

Shift from a cooperative to a more competitive approach towards Russia

•

Clearly articulate its position towards Russia, Eastern Europe, and Ukraine

•

Challenge Russia in the competition of ideas and influence

•

Account for the two national election cycles in 2016 and 2018

These recommendations address specific shortcomings in the U.S. approach to Russia
broadly and the crisis in Ukraine specifically. By implementing these recommendations, the United States can correct past missteps, which have collectively placed Washington in a reactive posture
and contributed to misunderstanding in allied capitals as well as Moscow regarding U.S. intentions
and interests.
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